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1 Introduction
Taxes on goods and services are among the most important sources of tax revenue
in the OECD and the single most important tax base in the European Union. The
deepening of economic integration, as signified by cross-border trade and the free
movement of goods, has put on the political agenda the issues of tax rate harmoniza-
tion and the choice of international tax principle. The European Union has agreed
on a common minimum rate for value-added taxation (VAT) in order to limit the
extent of private cross-border shopping, and a complete harmonization of VAT rates
has been proposed (European Commission, 1996). As for the choice of tax principle,
there is still widespread discussion within the EU as to whether one should abol-
ish the present system of consumption-based taxation (the destination principle)
and switch to taxes on production (the origin principle). This switch would allow
to eliminate border tax adjustments that are diﬃcult to maintain in the absence
of physical border controls, but it also implies that international VAT diﬀerentials
would aﬀect the competitiveness of firms. Given the rapid spread of value-added
taxation worldwide (see Cnossen, 1998) similar issues may soon be faced by other
integrating regions, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, or by federal
countries that introduce VAT at subnational levels.1
The issues of tax rate harmonization and the choice of commodity tax principle
have been discussed in a large literature which can be grouped into three diﬀerent
branches.2With few exceptions, however, these contributions have assumed perfectly
competitive product markets. A first strand in the literature analyzes the choice of
tax principle. A basic result here is that the destination and origin principles are
equivalent, if either exchange rates or producer prices are fully flexible, and if the
commodity tax can be levied on all goods at the same rate (see Lockwood, de
Meza and Myles, 1994). If there is some selectivity in commodity taxation, then an
important distinction arises as to whether tax rates are set in cooperative or non-
cooperative ways. With cooperative tax setting, the production eﬃciency theorem
leads to a general argument in favour of the destination principle, since the latter
implies that relative price distortions fall on consumer rather than producer prices
and international trade remains based on the principle of comparative advantage
1An example of the latter is India, where policy eﬀorts are under way to replace existing sales
taxes, levied under the origin principle, by a state-level VAT (Purohit, 2001).
2See Lockwood (2001) for a recent and thorough synthesis of this literature.
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(see, e.g., Keen and Smith, 1996).3 When taxes are set non-cooperatively, however,
and countries can aﬀect their terms of trade, then no clear argument emerges in
favour of one or the other tax principle (Lockwood, 1993; 2001, sec. 6).
A second set of papers deals with origin-based commodity tax competition
in the presence of cross-border shopping. Fundamental results here are that non-
cooperative tax rates will be set too low in at least one of the trading countries
(Mintz and Tulkens, 1986) and a minimum rate policy — such as that pursued in
the EU — leads to a strict Pareto improvement when revenue maximization is the
policy objective (Kanbur and Keen, 1993). Finally, a third branch in the literature
is concerned with tax rate harmonization when governments can levy diﬀerenti-
ated taxes under either the origin or the destination principle. If competition in
the goods market is perfect, and the government faces no revenue constraint, then
an approximation of tax rates leads to aggregate welfare gains, as it improves ex-
change eﬃciency under the destination principle (Keen, 1987, 1989) and production
eﬃciency under the origin principle (Lopez-Garcia, 1996). The conditions for tax
harmonization to constitute a Pareto improvement become much more stringent,
however, when tax revenues are needed to finance a public good (Delipalla, 1997;
Lockwood, 1997; Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 1998; Lopez-Garcia, 1998).
In sum, despite a number of caveats, the literature on international commodity
taxation in perfectly competitive product markets leads to qualified arguments (i)
in favour of the destination principle (when countries can cooperate over tax rates),
and (ii) in favour of tax rate harmonization. Given the policy relevance of these
results, it is important to ask whether they continue to hold when the assumption
of perfect competition is relaxed. In recent years a few papers have begun to analyze
the choice of tax principle and tax rate harmonization in imperfectly competitive
markets. Keen and Lahiri (1998) compare the destination and origin principles in
a duopoly model where cost structures of the two firms diﬀer. In this setting, they
show for a variety of cases under both coordinated and non-coordinated tax setting
that the origin principle is likely to dominate from a global eﬃciency perspective.4
3One caveat to this result is that production eﬃciency may not be desirable from the perspective
of world welfare maximization when the trading countries face separate budget constraints and
lump-sum transfers between them are excluded (Keen and Wildasin, 2000).
4Haufler, Schjelderup and Sta¨hler (2000) incorporate transport costs in the model of Keen and
Lahiri (1998) and focus on non-cooperative tax setting. In this framework the welfare comparison
between the destination and origin principles depends on the size of trade costs and the destination
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With respect to tax rate harmonization, Keen and Lahiri (1993) and Lockwood
(2001, sec. 5) have shown that the conditions for a harmonizing reform to be Pareto
improving are analogous to their counterparts in the perfectly competitive case when
taxes are levied under the destination principle. Under the origin principle, however,
the same harmonizing reform unambiguously reduces welfare in each country (Keen,
Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 2002). In sum, these analyses indicate that many of
the policy conclusions for the design of international commodity taxation depend
on the competitive conditions in product markets.
It is well known, however, that results derived in imperfectly competitive com-
modity markets often depend on the precise form that imperfect competition will
take. Hence a relevant question is whether the conclusions reached in the above-
mentioned literature — which have generally been derived in models of international
duopoly — carry over to other settings of imperfect competition. The present paper
explores the implications for international tax policy when imperfect competition
takes the form of tacit collusion between firms that operate in diﬀerent markets.
The basic questions we ask are which role the choice of commodity tax principle
on the one hand, and a policy of tax rate harmonization on the other, can play in
undermining the stability of collusive agreements between firms.
The importance of implicit collusion in an international framework — which in-
volves cooperation both within a country and across national boundaries — has
recently been highlighted by the record fine of $ 755 million (Euro 855 million) that
the European Commission has imposed on an international group of eight chemical
and pharmaceutical companies that have engaged in a vitamin price-fixing scheme
for nearly a decade (Financial Times, November 21, 2001, p. 1). It is also docu-
mented in a number of empirical studies. Slade (1995) studies 10 industries and
finds empirical evidence for international collusion in all but one of these industries.
Strong evidence for collusion is found in industries such as diamonds, wood pulp,
uranium yellowcake, canadian potash, and cement (see also Scherer, 1996). Detailed
evidence for collusion at the national level exists for the telecommunications sector
in New Zealand (see King, 1997) and for the Norwegian cement market (Steen and
Sørgard, 1999). The political importance of collusion is furthermore witnessed by the
many allegations of collusion at an international level, only some of which are taken
principle dominates the origin principle when these costs are suﬃciently high.
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to court.5 These cases also reveal the diﬃculty of addressing collusion by means of
conventional competition policy. The reason is that firms seldom go into explicit
contractual agreements over price or quantity fixing, but instead rely on secret talks
or signalling games in the market. These indirect ways of forming collusive agree-
ments imply that public prosecutors must rely on circumstancial evidence, which is
often insuﬃcient as a basis for allegations.
Against this background, the present paper uses a standard model of dynamic
price competition and tacit collusion, borrowed from the industrial organization lit-
erature. The theory of repeated games has been applied to a number of international
policy contexts, including the comparison of tariﬀs and quotas (Rotemberg and Sa-
loner, 1989) and the eﬀects of trade liberalization (Lommerud and Sørgard, 2001).
Recently, it has also been used to study the eﬀects of alternative loss oﬀset pro-
visions under the corporation tax in a closed-economy setting (Gendron, 2001). In
this paper we aim to show that this approach can also be usefully applied to issues
of international commodity taxation.
We employ a two-country, two-firm model of price competition where national
product markets may diﬀer in size and costs of production may vary across firms. In
addition, we impose exogenous diﬀerences in national VAT rates in the home coun-
tries of the two firms. In this framework we consider the choice of an international
tax principle and the eﬀects of tax rate harmonization in two diﬀerent cases. In the
first scenario, diﬀerences in costs of production are systematically linked to inter-
national tax diﬀerentials. In the second scenario, tax rates are the only asymmetry
between countries. Several of the propositions we derive in these settings strengthen
the policy case for the origin principle when markets are imperfectly competitive. We
also show that the argument against tax rate harmonization may be more general
than the previous literature has established.
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic
model of dynamic price competition as it applies in our setting. Section 3 asks how
diﬀerences in market size, costs of production and tax rates aﬀect the incentive of
5As a recent example, the competitive regulatory agencies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden
have taken coordinated action in bringing to court firms in the plastic pipe and electronics industry
for cooperating within national boundaries as well as colluding internationally by creating exclusive
national territories. Similar coordinated actions have also been undertaken within the EU in the
same industries (see Berlingske Tidende, 7 February, 1999, p.1).
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firms to break a collusive agreement. Based on this analysis, Section 4 compares
the stability of tacit collusion under the destination and origin principles. Section 5
analyzes the eﬀects of tax rate harmonization and Section 6 concludes.
2 The analytical framework
We follow the standard set-up of infinitely repeated games and consider two firms,
labelled i ∈ {1, 2} and located in countries 1 and 2, respectively.6 The two firms
produce amounts xi of an identical and homogenous good. Our analysis is partial
equilibrium in the sense that we focus on the imperfectly competitive market (or the
two national markets) for good x. Implicitly there is an untaxed, tradeable numeraire
good in the background which ensures that taxes have an eﬀect on relative prices.
In our international framework, tacit collusion between the two firms implies
that both firms refrain from exporting and each firm is thus a monopolist in its
home market. In each period, either firm may find it profitable to defect from this
implicit agreement and export to the other market, but it knows that this action
will cause future retaliation by the other firm. It is well known that there are a large
number of equilibria in this type of repeated game and we assume, as is usual in the
literature, that the Pareto optimal equilibrium from the viewpoint of the two firms
will be realized (see Tirole, 1988, p. 247).
It is a standard result under this set of assumptions that if firm i defects at all,
it will do so in the first period (t = 0). If firm i deviates from the cartel solution
at t = 0 and exports to country j, it will in this period catch firm j by surprise.
We call this the ‘deviation phase’ of the game. In the following period(s), however,
firm j retaliates by exporting to market i. This is the ‘punishment phase’ of the
game. As in most of the policy-oriented literature on repeated games, we assume a
trigger strategy which implies that firm j will retaliate by exporting to market i in all
subsequent periods.7 Hence, if one of the firms defects in period t = 0, then duopoly
competition will prevail in both markets in t = 1, 2, ...∞. Finally, in line with the
assumption that governments cannot eﬀectively control the imperfectly competitive
6The assumption that there is only one firm in each market can either be interpreted in a strict
sense, or in the sense that several firms in a national industry collude.
7It is shown in Abreu (1986) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) that the trigger strategy is
subgame perfect.
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market for good x, we assume that national markets are segmented, i.e., diﬀerent
producer prices can be set in the two national markets under both monopolistic and
duopolistic market structures.
In the following, we denote by πMi the per-period profits of firm i if it acts as a
monopolist in its domestic market, πEi are the extra profits in period 0 when the firm
defects and exports into the other market, and πDi are firm i’s total duopoly profits
per period (earned in both markets together) under mutual export competition.
Denoting by δi the discount factor of firm i (0 < δi < 1), defection from the cartel
solution will be unprofitable when
πMi
1− δi
≥ (πMi + πEi ) +
µ
δi
1− δi
¶
πDi ∀ i ∈ {1, 2},
where we have used the summation rules for infinite series starting at time t = 0
and t = 1, respectively. The LHS of this inequality gives the discounted sum of
monopoly profits in all periods, whereas the RHS gives total profits in the defection
period 0 (the sum of domestic monopoly profits and profits in the export market)
and duopoly profits in both markets thereafter.
In general, it cannot be excluded in this type of model that πMi < π
D
i for one of
the two firms. In this case, it would always be profitable for this firm to leave the
collusive agreement, since it will gain not only in the deviation phase but also in
the punishment phase of the game. Since we focus only on conditions under which
tax policy aﬀects the stability of collusive arrangements, we disregard these cases in
the following and assume that πMi > π
D
i holds throughout the analysis. The above
inequality can then be rearranged to give the following ‘stability condition’ for the
collusive agreement:
θi ≥ θ¯mi =
πEi
πMi − πDi
∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (1)
Here, we have introduced θi ≡ δi/(1−δi) as the relative discount factor of firm i, and
θ¯mi denotes the critical value of this factor that just leaves the firm indiﬀerent between
staying in the secret cartel and defecting. These critical values depend on both the
tax principle in operation (destination or origin principle, m ∈ {DP,OP}) and on
the nature of duopoly competition. For brevity, we consider only price (Bertrand)
competition between firms.8
8For isolated diﬀerences in tax rates, the case of quantity (Cournot) competition has been ana-
lyzed in a previous working paper version (Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000) and leads to qualitatively
similar results.
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Since the gains from defecting accrue in t = 0, but the losses due to export
competition are felt only later, it is intuitive that the cartel will be more stable,
the higher are the firms’ relative discount factors θi (i.e., the closer the absolute
discount factor δi is to its maximum value of unity). We assume in the following
that the relative discount factor is the same for both firms (θ1 = θ2 = θ), an
obvious interpretation being that both firms calculate their discount factors from
the common market interest rate.9 The critical values of these discount factors (θ¯i)
will, however, diﬀer between the two firms when the profit terms in eq. (1) diﬀer due
to an underlying asymmetry. The firm with the higher critical value of θ¯i will then
be the one which is more likely to break the collusive arrangement and hence it is
this firm’s θ¯i that is binding for the stability of the secret cartel.
10 In the following,
we thus focus on the comparison of the binding critical values of θ¯i under diﬀerent
tax policies. The implication is that the higher is θ¯i under a given scenario, the lower
is the likelihood that the collusive agreement will be stable, in the sense that only a
smaller range of (common) relative discount factors θ sustains the cartel solution.
3 Determinants of cartel stability
In this section we focus on the diﬀerent eﬀects that consumption- versus production-
based commodity taxes have on the stability of the collusive agreement. Consistent
with the use of value-added taxation as the primary source of indirect tax revenue, we
assume that each country levies an ad valorem tax rate ti on good x, where 1 ≥ ti ≥
0.11 Tax rates remain exogenous in our analysis and, importantly, generally diﬀer
9The important simplifying assumptions underlying our specification are that the discount
factors are common knowledge and that they are time-invariant. See Martin (1993, ch. 5) for a
discussion of the additional eﬀects introduced by discount factors that vary over time.
10If firm j has the higher critical value of θ¯, then firm i (i 6= j) could improve the stability of
the collusive agreement by oﬀering firm j a new contract (for example a fifty-fifty split of the two
markets). Such market sharing, however, poses a problem. The reason is that it is much easier to
detect a breach of agreement if a firm exports (when it should not) than if it produces beyond the
agreed export quota. The cost of monitoring, therefore, provides cartels with an incentive to set
up exclusive territories (see Marvel 1982, and Tirole 1988, pp. 183 and 185).
11It is well known that, in contrast to the competitive case, specific and ad valorem taxes are
not equivalent under imperfect competition. Venables (1986) and, in more detail, Delipalla and
Keen (1992) show that ad valorem taxes lead to lower consumer prices and profits in the oligopoly
equilibrium as compared to specific taxes.
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between countries. In addition to diﬀerences in tax rates, we allow for diﬀerences in
the size of national markets and in the unit costs ci of the competing firms.
Before we turn to the separate analyses of the destination and origin principles,
we can compute each firm’s monopoly profits πMi . These are unaﬀected by the in-
ternational tax principle in operation because with two monopolies each serving the
domestic market only, there is no trade in good x. We assume that demand func-
tions in both markets are linear and given by xi = ai − qi = ai − (1 + ti)pi. The
parameter ai > 0 gives maximum sales at a price of zero and is thus an indicator of
market size. Consumer and producer prices are denoted by qi and pi, respectively.
The per-period profits of firm i in its home market are then
πi = pixi − cixi = (pi − ci) [ai − (1 + ti)pi] ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (2)
The monopoly problem can be solved by choosing either the producer price pi
or the quantity sold xi. In both cases it is straightforward to show that the solution
to the maximization problem yields
pi =
1
2
·
ai
(1 + ti)
+ ci
¸
, qi =
1
2
[ai + (1 + ti) ci] , xi =
ai − (1 + ti) ci
2
∀ i.
(3)
For positive costs of production, our model implies that taxes are partly shifted into
consumer prices and partly fall on producers. Note, however, that in the special case
of zero costs the commodity tax is fully shifted backwards into producer prices and
eﬀectively becomes a pure profit tax.
The prices and quantities given by (3) yield per-period monopoly profits of
πMi =
α2i
4 (1 + ti)
, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (4)
αi ≡ ai − (1 + ti) ci > 0 ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}. (5)
Note that αi must be positive for positive sales in country i [see eq. (3)]. The
monopoly profits of each firm in its domestic market are thus positively related to
market size and depend negatively on unit production costs and taxes.
In the following we derive explicit expressions for the remaining profit terms in
eq. (1), i.e., exporting profits πEi and duopoly profits π
D
i . These terms depend on
the underlying tax principle.
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3.1 The destination principle
Under the destination principle commodity taxes are levied in the country where
the good is consumed. This implies that firms located in countries with diﬀerent tax
rates will nevertheless compete in each market on an equal tax footing.
If firm i deviates from the cartel solution and exports to market j (j 6= i), firm
j is initially unaware of the breach of agreement. Firm j will therefore continue to
set its monopoly price as given by eq. (3). Under price competition, this implies
that firm i can capture the whole market in country j by slightly undercutting
this price. Firm i’s exports are taxed at the rate tj under the destination principle,
but its exporting profits will generally diﬀer from firm j’s monopoly profits due to
diﬀerences in production costs. Using eq. (3) and rewriting yields
π
E(DP )
i = (pj − ci) xj =
αj
4(1 + tj)
[αj + 2(1 + tj) (cj − ci)] ∀ i 6= j . (6)
Comparing this with (2) shows that firm i’s profits from exporting into country j
exceed firm j’s monopoly profits if cj > ci, and fall below π
M
j otherwise.
In the following we adopt the convention that, if costs diﬀer between firms, then
firm j has the higher unit cost and cj > ci. We restrict cost diﬀerences between
the two firms by assuming that the high-cost firm will still be able to make positive
profits from exporting to market i. This implies the following condition:
αi − 2(1 + ti)(cj − ci) > 0. (7)
When firm j observes that firm i has defected from the cartel, it will respond by
exporting to market i and there will be export competition in both markets in
all future periods. Firm i as, the low-cost firm, will then set its price just below
cj and sweep both markets, earning (cj − ci) [ai − (1 + ti)cj]/2 in market i and
(cj−ci) [aj−(1+tj)cj]/2 in market j. Firm j will earn zero profits in the punishment
phase. Using (5), per-period duopoly profits of the two firms are
π
D(DP )
i = (cj − ci) [αi + αj − (1 + ti)(cj − ci)], π
D(DP )
j = 0.
In the special case where both firms have equal costs, price competition under the
destination principle implies that profits in the duopoly equilibrium fall to zero for
both firms. It is this severe eﬀect of competition in the later stages of the game which
‘disciplines’ the firms and gives an incentive to stick to the collusive agreement.
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We can now substitute (4), (6) and (8) into (1). The critical discount factors at
which each of the two firms is indiﬀerent between defecting and remaining in the
secret cartel are for firms i and j, respectively:
θ¯DPi =
(1 + ti) αj[αj + 2(1 + tj)(cj − ci)]
(1 + tj){α2i − 2(1 + ti)(cj − ci)[αi + αj − (1 + ti)(cj − ci)]}
, (8a)
θ¯DPj =
(1 + tj) αi[αi − 2(1 + ti)(cj − ci)]
(1 + ti) α2j
. (8b)
In the following, we consider three special cases of (8a)—(8b), corresponding to
isolated diﬀerences in tax rates, market size, and production costs. In each case, we
determine which firm is more likely to defect from the collusive agreement.12
Case A: ti 6= tj (ai = aj, ci = cj)
When only destination-based tax rates diﬀer between the two markets, then
equation set (8a)—(8b) reduces to
θ¯DPi =
(1 + ti)
(1 + tj)
α2j
α2i
∀ i 6= j. (9)
Recalling (5), it is directly inferred from (9) that the firm in the high-tax country
will be more likely to break the collusive agreement under the destination principle.
If, for example, ti > tj, then the numerator in θ¯
DP
i is larger and the denominator is
smaller for firm i, as compared to firm j. Intuitively, firm i’s gains from defecting
are given by the monopoly profits in the relatively profitable (low-tax) market j,
while the losses occur in the less profitable home market i.
Case B: ai 6= aj (ti = tj, ci = cj)
With isolated diﬀerences in market size, equation set (8a)—(8b) collapses to
θ¯DPi = α
2
j/α
2
i ∀ i 6= j. Hence the firm located in the smaller market will be more
likely to defect from the cartel. The reasoning is very similar to the one given above:
if, for example, ai < aj then firm i’s exporting profits accrue in the larger market j,
whereas the losses in the punishment phase fall in the smaller home market i.
12If countries and firms are symmetric in all respects, then the critical values of θ¯ reduce to 1
for both firms. From the definition θ ≡ δ/(1− δ) this implies a critical absolute discount factor of
δ = 1/2, thus reproducing a standard result in symmetric models of repeated price competition
(see Tirole, 1988, p. 246).
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Case C: ci ≤ cj (ti = tj, ai = aj)
In this case, we can simplify (8a)—(8b) with the help of (5) to get
θ¯DPi =
αj[αi + (1 + t)(cj − ci)]
α2i − 4(1 + t)(cj − ci)αj
, (10a)
θ¯DPj =
αi[αj − (1 + t)(cj − ci)]
α2j
. (10b)
Comparing first the numerators in (10a) and (10b), this is larger for the low-
cost firm i, which has the higher gains from exporting to the foreign market. The
comparison of the denominators is somewhat more complicated because the low-
cost firm obtains the larger monopoly profits in its home market. It can be shown,
however, that this eﬀect is more than compensated by the higher profits of firm i in
the duopoly equilibrium so that the denominator is smaller for the low-cost firm.13
Hence, firm i has the unambiguously higher value of θ¯DP . Our results under the
destination principle are summarized in
Lemma 1: Under the destination principle, a firm is more likely to break the
collusive agreement if it (i) operates in the high-tax country; (ii) has the smaller
home market; (iii) has the lower costs of production.
3.2 The origin principle
Under the origin principle, commodities are taxed in the country of production, but
are exempted from tax in the importing country. Hence tax diﬀerentials aﬀect the
relative competitiveness of the two firms in each market.
If firm i breaks the collusive agreement and exports to market j it can again
capture the entire market by slightly undercutting firm j. The diﬀerence to the
destination principle is that firm i will now base its pricing decision on the monopoly
consumer price charged by firm j. From (3), this equals qj = [aj + (1 + tj)cj]/2.
Given that the tax rate applicable to firm i’s sales to market j is ti, the maximum
13From the comparison of the denominators in (10a) and (10b), the condition that has to be
fulfilled is α2j − α2i + 4(cj − ci)(1 + t)αj > 0. Using the binomial rules and (5) this reduces to
(1+ t)(cj − ci)(3αj −αi) = 2αi− 3(1+ t)(cj − ci), which is positive if the high-cost firm is to make
positive exporting profits in the deviation phase [cf. (7)].
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producer price that firm i can charge is [aj+(1+ tj)cj]/[2(1+ ti)]. From (3), demand
in country j for the consumer price qj is αj/2. Hence, using (5), maximum profits
from exporting are equal to
π
E(OP )
i =
αj
4(1 + ti)
{αj + 2[(1 + tj)cj − (1 + ti)ci]} ∀ i 6= j. (11)
Eq. (11) shows that under the origin principle the tax rate in the defecting firm’s
home country and this firm’s unit costs have additive eﬀects on the profitability of
exporting. As before, we let firm j have the higher unit costs of production, grossed
up by the origin-based ad valorem tax [(1 + tj)cj > (1 + ti)ci]. Hence, exporting
profits are larger for firm i. A condition similar to (7) ensures that (11) will also be
positive for the high-cost firm j.
In the duopoly equilibrium, price competition will lead firm j to charge a con-
sumer price of qi = qj = cj(1 + tj) in both markets and make zero profits. This
allows firm i to charge a producer price of (1+ tj)cj/(1+ ti), leaving a profit margin
of [(1+ tj)cj−(1+ ti)ci]/(1+ ti) per unit of output sold in either market. Since, for a
consumer price of (1 + tj)cj, demand is αj/2 in each of the two markets, per-period
duopoly profits under the origin principle are given by
π
D(OP )
i =
[(1 + tj)cj − (1 + ti)ci]αj
(1 + ti)
, π
D(OP )
j = 0. (12)
Substituting (4), (11) and (12) into (1) gives critical values θ¯OP for firms i and j:
θ¯OPi =
αj{αj + 2[(1 + tj)cj − (1 + ti)ci]}
α2i − 4αj[(1 + tj)cj − (1 + ti)ci]
, (13a)
θ¯OPj =
αi{αi − 2[(1 + tj)cj − (1 + ti)ci]}
α2j
. (13b)
Based on these general expressions, we again consider the three special cases of
isolated diﬀerences in tax rates, market size, and production costs.
Case A: ti ≤ tj (ai = aj, ci = cj)
When costs are equal for the two firms, but firm j is located in the high-tax
country, the critical vales of θ¯ for the two firms are14
θ¯OPi =
[αi + c(tj − ti)]αj
[αj − c (tj − ti)]2
, θ¯OPj =
[αj − c(tj − ti)]αi
α2j
for tj > ti. (14)
14The denominator of θ¯OPi in (14) is obtained from α2i − 4αjc (tj − ti) using αi = αj + c (tj − ti)
and the binomial rules.
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Eq. (14) shows that if firm i is located in the low-tax country, then the numerator of
θ¯i is larger, and the denominator is smaller, than for the rival firm j. Since firm i is
faced with larger exporting profits and smaller losses from non-cooperation, it will
impose the binding constraint on the stability of the collusive agreement.
Case B: ai 6= aj (ti = tj, ci = cj)
With isolated diﬀerences in market size, equation set (13a)—(13b) reduces to
θ¯OPi = α
2
j/α
2
i ∀ i 6= j, which is the same expression as under the destination principle.
Hence the result that the firm in the smaller market is more likely to defect from
the cartel holds under both tax principles.
Case C: ci ≤ cj (ti = tj, ai = aj)
When only costs of production diﬀer between the two firms then the critical
values for θ¯ derived from (13a)—(13b) are identical to those obtained under the
destination principle [eqs. (10a)—(10b)]. Hence it is again the low-cost firm that is
more likely to break the secret cartel. We summarize these results in
Lemma 2: Under the origin principle, a firm is more likely to break the collusive
agreement if it (i) operates in the low-tax country; (ii) has the smaller home market;
(iii) has the lower costs of production.
Comparing Lemmas 1 and 2 we find that the choice of tax principle is immaterial
for the question which firm will break the collusive agreement when tax rates are
equal across countries, but either the size of the home market or production costs
diﬀer between the two firms (Cases B and C). However, isolated diﬀerences in the
rates of commodity tax have precisely the opposite eﬀects under the destination and
origin principles (Case A).
4 The choice of tax principle
In the previous section we have determined how isolated diﬀerences in market size,
production costs and tax rates aﬀect the stability of collusive agreements under
each tax principle, and which of the two firms is more likely to defect in each
of the diﬀerent scenarios. Having laid this groundwork, we are now in a position
to compare the stability of collusive agreements under the destination and origin
13
principles. We will do this in two diﬀerent settings. First, we analyze the interaction
of tax diﬀerentials with underlying — and dominating — diﬀerences in production
costs.15 This allows us to link the results derived in our tacit collusion framework to
the existing literature on commodity taxation in international duopoly markets. In a
second step, we compare the destination and origin principles when tax diﬀerentials
are the main and, for simplicity, the only source of asymmetry.
4.1 Diﬀerences in production costs
We consider the case where firm 1 is the low-cost firm while both markets are of
equal size. Furthermore, we assume that diﬀerences in costs dominate tax diﬀerences
under both tax principles. Under these assumptions, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that
firm 1 will impose the binding constraint on the stability of the collusive agreement.
Under the destination principle, we get from (8a) and ai = aj
θ¯DP1 =
[(1 + t1)/(1 + t2)]α2[α2 + 2(1 + t2)(c2 − c1)]
α21 − 2(1 + t1)(c2 − c1)[2α2 − (t1 − t2)c2]
. (15)
Under the origin principle, we get from (13a) and ai = aj
θ¯OP1 =
α2{α2 + 2[(1 + t2)c2 − (1 + t1)c1]}
α21 − 4α2[(1 + t2)c2 − (1 + t1)c1]
. (16)
Comparing (15) and (16) gives
Proposition 1: If the firm with the lower costs of production faces the lower
(higher) tax rate, then tacit collusion is more likely (less likely) under the destination
principle than under the origin principle.
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward. Given that firm 1 imposes the
binding constraint on the stability of the collusive agreement, we only have to ask
whether tax diﬀerentials reinforce or counteract the incentive of this firm to leave
the secret cartel. Under the destination principle, a low tax rate in country 1 makes
the domestic market more profitable and thus counteracts the incentive for the
low-cost firm 1 to defect from the collusive agreement. Under the origin principle, in
15As indicated by Lemmas 1 and 2, the framework set up in the previous section can also be
used to analyze diﬀerences in market size. To save space, the analysis of this case is not carried
out in detail in this paper, but a brief summary of the results is given (see footnote 16 below).
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contrast, a low tax rate in country 1 gives the low-cost firm an additional competitive
advantage, which raises its exporting profits and limits the losses in the punishment
phase. Therefore, if t1 < t2, the incentive of the low-cost firm to defect from the
collusive agreement is reinforced under the origin principle, but weakened under the
destination principle. If t1 > t2 holds instead, the opposite conclusions follow.
Proposition 1 indicates that the view one takes on the choice of commodity tax
principle and its impact on collusion depends very much on how cost levels and
tax rates are correlated. Previous work on non-cooperative commodity taxation in
the presence of cost diﬀerences between internationally operating firms has estab-
lished that, other things being equal, the country hosting the low-cost firm will set
the lower tax rate under both tax principles (Keen and Lahiri, 1993; Keen, Lahiri
and Raimondos-Møller, 2002). The reason is that with equal demand conditions the
country hosting the low-cost firm will export the good produced in the imperfectly
competitive market. Hence, it will gain by strategically reducing the tax in order to
raise domestic demand and increase the world price. Under the origin principle, an
incentive to subsidize domestic output arises for both countries. This ‘rent shifting
eﬀect’, known from the literature on strategic trade policy (Brander and Spencer,
1985), is stronger for the country hosting the more eﬃcient firm, which will there-
fore set the lower tax rate in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Thus, the literature
provides a strong argument for that countries with low commodity tax rates play
host to low-cost firms. Using this as a guidance for interpreting Proposition 1, we
conclude that the origin principle is less likely to lead to a stable cartel.16
Summing up the results in this section, a collusive agreement is less likely to be
sustained under the origin principle, if the firm with the larger incentive to defect
(firm 1) faces a lower tax rate than its foreign rival. The literature on non-cooperative
commodity taxation in open economies has established several arguments why such
a relationship can indeed be expected. If these results are incorporated into our
analysis, then Proposition 1 implies an argument in favour of origin-based commod-
ity taxes under the presumption that a stable cartel is undesirable from a social
welfare perspective. It is easily shown in our model that the equilibrium producer
16If market size diﬀers between countries, instead of firms’ production costs, similar arguments
as the ones given above apply. It emerges that tacit collusion will be more likely (less likely) under
the destination principle, as compared to the origin principle, if the firm with the smaller home
market faces the lower (higher) tax rate. The full analysis of this case if available from the authors.
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price under duopoly competition is always below monopoly prices in both markets,
even if costs diﬀer across firms. To see this under the destination principle, compare
the monopoly prices given in (3) with the duopoly price cj (where cj > ci). It follows
from condition (7) that even the monopoly price charged by the low-cost firm i ex-
ceeds the common duopoly price cj. An analogous condition holds under the origin
principle [see the discussion of eq. (11)]. With prices lower under duopoly than in
each national monopoly, total output is larger, and hence closer to its eﬃcient level,
if the firms engage in duopoly competition. Thus, using a simple but conventional
welfare measure by adding up consumer surplus, producer profits and tax revenue,
a normative interpretation of our results is that we should prefer the tax policy that
is more likely to induce duopoly competition.
In this sense, our results are complementary to the findings of Keen and Lahiri
(1998) who show that the origin principle is likely to Pareto dominate the destination
principle if firms engage in Cournot duopoly competition. In their framework, the
market structure is given and the superiority of origin-based taxes derives from
the property that they can be more directly targeted at the underlying production
distortion. In contrast, the welfare argument for the origin principle in the present
model is based on its greater ability to eﬀect a change in market structure.
Recall, however, that the statement in Proposition 1 that one tax principle is
“more likely” to maintain tacit collusion implies merely that a secret cartel is an
equilibrium outcome for a larger range of common discount factors θ (cf. section 2).
Depending on the actual values of the firms’ discount factors, it is also possible that
collusion is stable under both tax principles considered, or under none of them.
4.2 Isolated diﬀerences in tax rates
In the previous section we have assumed that diﬀerences in tax rates are system-
atically linked to an underlying asymmetry in production costs. From an empirical
perspective it is not clear, however, that production costs are a primary determinant
of commodity tax rates. Instead, diﬀerences in commodity tax levels are often at-
tributed to diﬀerent preferences for public goods and redistribution. In addition, an
important determinant of the direct-indirect tax mix in each country is the ability of
national tax administrations to control income tax evasion (see Boadway, Marchand
and Pestieau, 1994).
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To incorporate the possibility that commodity tax diﬀerentials are caused by
factors unrelated to firms’ costs of production, we now consider a setting where
exogenous diﬀerences in tax rates are the only source of asymmetry. This set-up
implies that the (unmodelled) determinants of international tax diﬀerentials do not
aﬀect the profitability of firms.
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that if tax rates are the only diﬀerence between
countries, then the firm in the high-tax country will be more likely to leave the
collusive agreement under the destination principle, but the firm in the low-tax
country is more likely to defect under the origin principle. We adopt the convention,
with no loss of generality, that country 1 is the low-tax country and t1 < t2. With
this assumption our previous findings in eqs. (9) and (14) imply that the following
critical values are binding under the two tax principles:
θ¯DP2 =
(1 + t2)
(1 + t1)
α21
α22
, θ¯OP1 =
[α1 + c (t2 − t1)] α2
[α2 − c (t2 − t1)]2
. (17)
We then obtain the following result:
Proposition 2:When tax rates are the only asymmetry between countries, then
a stable collusive agreement is less likely under the destination principle, as compared
to the origin principle, if (i) market size is large and (ii) costs of production are low.
Proof: See the appendix.
To interpret this result note first that if tax rates are the only asymmetry, then a
larger international tax diﬀerential weakens the stability of the collusive agreement
under both tax principles. It is seen from (17) that the critical values of θ¯ are always
at a minimum when tax rates are equal. Next, recall that a tax diﬀerential has very
diﬀerent eﬀects under the two tax principles. Under the destination principle it is
the diﬀerence in the profitability of the two markets which is crucial for the incentive
to leave the secret cartel. Other things equal, this diﬀerence will be magnified when
the common market size parameter a is large. Under the origin principle, a tax
diﬀerential changes the competitive position of the two firms. Since taxes are levied
ad valorem, the absolute cost advantage of the low-tax firm becomes larger when
costs of production are high. In the special case of zero production costs, taxes
under the origin principle are essentially pure profit taxes and tacit collusion is
unambiguously less likely under the destination principle.17
17To see this, note that if c = 0, then α1 = α2 = a and the terms in (17) reduce to θ¯DP2 =
(1 + t2)/(1 + t1) and θ¯OP1 = 1. For t1 < t2, this implies θ¯DP2 > θ¯OP1 .
17
While no unambiguous result emerges for the comparison of destination and
origin principles when tax diﬀerences are the only asymmetry, we can go one step
further and relax the assumption that there are only two countries and two firms.
What would happen if there were instead n countries each hosting a firm? To consider
this case note that, irrespective of the tax principle in operation, profits in the
deviation phase would go up since a cheating firm can export to (n− 1) markets and
earn profits in each of these markets. Ceteris paribus this destabilizes the cartel. In
the deviation phase, however, there are now (n− 1) firms that potentially can export
into the home market of the cheating firm. This may lower profits in the punishment
phase and, ceteris paribus, stabilize the cartel. The full eﬀect on cartel stability must
therefore take into account the benefit of cheating and the consequences of breaking
out of the cartel in the noncooperative stages of the game. In general the inclusion of
many countries allows for a wide range of diﬀerent constellations of tax rates and cost
and market asymmetries. It is therefore not possible to make a general statement
as to the eﬀect on cartel stability without making some restrictive assumptions.
However, it is straightforward to analyze this extension in the setting where an
international tax diﬀerence is the only force aﬀecting the stability of the cartel. Let
us start with the destination principle. As before, it will be the firm in the country
with the highest tax rate (firm 2) that has the greatest incentive to leave the collusive
agreement. Assume now that there is only one high-tax country, in which firm 2 is
located, while there are (n − 1) low-tax countries, each hosting a firm of type 1.18
The total exporting profits of firm 2 from selling in all low-tax markets are given by
ΠE(DP )2 = (n− 1) π
E(DP )
2 .
In the duopoly equilibrium, profits are zero for all firms if the destination prin-
ciple is applied. Thus, breaking out of the cartel does not aﬀect the noncooperative
phase of the game. We denote firm 2’s critical discount value in this extended setting
by Θ¯DP2 . This value is given by
Θ¯DP2 =
ΠE(DP )2
πM2
=
(n− 1) πE(DP )2
πM2
= (n− 1) θ¯DP2 . (18)
Hence, under the destination principle, the critical value of the firm that is most
likely to defect (firm 2) rises in proportion to the number of markets into which this
firm can export in the deviation phase.
18All qualitative results would be unchanged (but the notation would be much more cumber-
some), if we assumed instead that each of the n countries had a diﬀerent tax rate.
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Consider now the origin principle. Here, it is the firm in the country with the
lowest tax rate (firm 1) that is most likely to break up the cartel. For symmetry, we
assume now that there are one low-tax country and (n − 1) high-tax countries. In
the deviation phase, firm 1 sells to all high-tax markets, making exporting profits
equal to ΠE(OP )1 = (n− 1) π
E(OP )
1 . In contrast to the destination principle, however,
the low-tax firm also earns positive profits in the non-cooperative phase of the game.
These profits rise as the low-tax country can exploit its tax advantage to undercut
firms in (n−1) markets, yielding ΠD(OP )1 = (n−1) π
D(OP )
1 . Firm 1’s critical discount
value, Θ¯OP1 , is thus given by
Θ¯OP1 =
ΠE(OP )1
πM1 −Π
D(OP )
1
=
(n− 1) πE(OP )1
πM1 − (n− 1)π
E(OP )
1
=
·
(n− 1) + (n− 2) π
M
1
πM1 − (n− 1)πD1
¸
θ¯OP1 .
(19)
Since the second term in the squared bracket is unambiguously rising in n, this result
implies that the critical value of firm 1 rises more than proportionally as the number
of countries increases. This is because the higher profits that firm 1 makes in the
deviation phase have an additional destabilizing eﬀect on the collusive agreement
that is not present under the destination principle. We summarize these results in
Proposition 3:When the number of countries (and firms) is increased, and tax
rates are the only asymmetry between countries, a stable collusive agreement becomes
less likely both tax principles. However, the destabilizing eﬀect is stronger under the
origin principle.
The first part of the proposition is in line with previous findings in the literature,
which show that cartels are destabilized by expanding the number of firms (see e.g.,
Abreu, 1986 and Bernheim and Whinston, 1990). The second part states that even
in a setting where tax rates are the only asymmetry the origin principle has some
merits in destabilizing collusive agreements when the model is extended to account
for more than two countries and firms.
5 Tax rate harmonization
In this section we turn to the implications of tax rate harmonization for the stability
of tacit collusion. The analysis is carried out in the same settings as in the previous
section. Let ti < tj, i 6= j. We define a harmonizing reform in a broad sense
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as any narrowing of the tax diﬀerential between the two countries. As a special
case, this incorporates a unilateral increase in the tax rate of the low-tax country
(dti > 0, dtj = 0). This has been the approach to commodity tax harmonization
in the European Union, and it is also a common definition in the literature (see,
e.g., Kanbur and Keen, 1993). Alternatively, a narrowing of the tax diﬀerential can
be brought about by an isolated reduction in the tax rate of the high-tax country
(dti = 0, dtj < 0) or by a simultaneous alignment of tax rates in both countries
(dti > 0, dtj < 0). The latter policy corresponds to a move towards a common
average of initial tax rates. This harmonization scheme was initially suggested for
EU commodity tax harmonization, and it is also used frequently in theoretical work
(e.g., Keen, 1987, 1989).
5.1 Diﬀerences in production costs
We first consider the case where the firms have diﬀerent costs of production and
tax rates diﬀer across countries, but market size is identical. Again, we adopt the
convention that c1 < c2 and cost diﬀerences exceed tax diﬀerences so that firm 1’s
critical value of θ¯ is binding under both tax principles. Moreover, we focus on the
case where the country hosting the low-cost firm (country 1) levies the lower tax in
the absence of tax coordination. Hence we evaluate
dθ¯m1 =
∂θ¯m1
∂t1
dt1 +
∂θ¯m1
∂t2
dt2 for t1 < t2; dt1 ≥ 0, dt2 ≤ 0 . (20)
Under the destination principle, diﬀerentiating the critical values of θ¯1 in (15)
with respect to t1 and t2 yields
∂θ¯DP1
∂t1
=
α2[α2 + 2(1 + t2)(c2 − c1)] {ε1 + (1 + t1)[2α1c1 + 2(c2 − c1)γ]}
(1 + t2)ε21
> 0,
∂θ¯DP1
∂t2
=
−(1 + t1){(1 + t2ε1[2α2c1 + c2δ] + α2δ[ε1 + (1 + t1)c2δ]}
(1 + t2)2ε21
< 0,
(21)
where ε1 ≡ α21 − 2(1 + t1)(c2 − c1)[2α2 − (t1 − t2)c2] > 0 from (15), γ ≡ 2α2 − (t1 −
t2)c2 − (1 + t1)c2 > 0 from condition (7) and δ ≡ 2(1 + t2)(c2 − c1) > 0.
Under the origin principle, diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to t1 and t2 gives
∂θ¯OP1
∂t1
=
−α2[2c1ε2 + 2(α2 + 2φ)(α2 − φ)]
ε22
< 0,
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∂θ¯OP1
∂t2
=
4c2[α2 − (1 + t2)c2](α22 + 2α2φ)− 2c2φ(α21 − 4α2φ)
ε22
> 0, (22)
where ε2 ≡ α21− 4α2[(1 + t2)c2− (1 + t1)c1] > 0 from (16) and φ ≡ (1 + t2)c2− (1 +
t1)c1 > 0. In the numerator of ∂θ¯
OP
1 /∂t2, the positive first term exceeds the second
because 2c2[2α2−2(1+t2)c2−φ] > 0 from condition (7). From the same condition it
follows that (α22+2α2φ)− (α21−4α2φ) = [(1+ t2)2c22− (1+ t1)2c21]+φ(6α2−2a) > 0.
Substituting (21) and (22) in (20) shows that the reform dh increases the critical
value of θ¯DP1 and reduces the critical value of θ¯
OP
1 . This result is summarized in
Proposition 4: If the low-cost firm faces the lower tax rate, then any alignment
of tax rates makes a collusive agreement less likely under the destination principle,
but more likely under the origin principle.
This result is easily understood. Under the destination principle, the incentives
for the low-cost firm to defect from the secret cartel are partly oﬀset if the firm’s
home country has a lower tax rate than its neighbour. Tax harmonization weakens
this oﬀsetting eﬀect arising from international tax diﬀerentials and thus tends to
raise the critical value of θ¯DP . Under the origin principle, in contrast, a low domestic
tax rate strengthens the incentive for the low-cost firm to defect from the collusive
agreement. A narrowing of the tax diﬀerential mitigates this eﬀect and accordingly
lowers θ¯OP1 . Therefore, any narrowing of the tax diﬀerential destabilizes the secret
cartel under the destination principle, but stabilizes it under the origin principle.19
Our above analysis has incorporated the result from the literature on non-
cooperative international commodity taxation that countries hosting a low-cost firm
tend to levy lower taxes (or higher subsidies). In this setting Proposition 4 implies
that tax rate harmonization is desirable under the destination principle, in the sense
that it increases the likelihood that a socially unwanted secret cartel will break up.
Under the origin principle, however, the opposite is true and tax rate harmonization
will have undesirable, ‘stabilizing’ eﬀects on the collusive agreement. Interestingly,
these results correspond precisely to the contrasting eﬀects that tax rate harmo-
nization has in duopoly models of imperfect competition when production (cost)
19Again, it is straightforward to analyze the eﬀects of tax rate harmonization if diﬀerences in
market size, rather than production costs, are the underlying asymmetry. In this case we find that
if the firm with the smaller home market faces the lower tax rate, then any narrowing of the tax
diﬀerential makes a collusive agreement less likely under the destination principle, but more likely
under the origin principle (details are available from the authors).
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characteristics diﬀer in the two markets. As shown by Keen and Lahiri (1993) and
Lockwood (2001, sec. 5), tax rate harmonization under the destination principle will
be welfare-enhancing in these circumstances, because it has no eﬀects on production
but aligns relative consumer prices across countries. In contrast, Keen, Lahiri and
Raimondos-Møller (2002) have shown that tax rate harmonization under the origin
principle will be welfare-reducing in the presence of cost diﬀerentials, because it
increases the market share of the less eﬃcient firm and thus reduces international
production eﬃciency. The driving force behind this last result, as in our Proposi-
tion 4, is that tax diﬀerentials under the origin principle reinforce the incentive for
the low-cost firm to enter the foreign market.
5.2 Isolated diﬀerences in tax rates
Lastly, we consider the case where exogenous diﬀerences in tax rates are the only
asymmetry between countries. Assuming again, without loss of generality, that t1 <
t2, the binding constraints for the stability of the collusive agreement are given
in (17). Diﬀerentiation with respect to t1 and t2 yields under the destination principle
∂θ¯DP2
∂t1
=
−(1 + t2)α1[2c(1 + t1) + α1]
(1 + t1)2α22
< 0,
θ¯DP2
∂t2
=
α21[α2 + 2c(1 + t2)]
(1 + t1)α32
> 0 .
(23)
Similarly, we get under the origin principle
θ¯OP1
∂t1
=
−2α2c(α1 + α2)
[α2 − c(t2 − t1)]3
< 0,
θ¯OP1
∂t2
=
2c[2α2 − c(t2 − t1)][α2 − c(t2 − t1)] + 4α2c2(t2 − t1)
[α2 − c(t2 − t1)]2
> 0 . (24)
Substituting (23) and (24), respectively, into (20), we get the following result:
Proposition 5: If only tax rates diﬀer between countries, then tax rate harmo-
nization stabilizes a collusive agreement under both the destination and the origin
principle.
This last result follows directly from the model property that, absent other asym-
metries, tax diﬀerentials are critical in destabilizing the collusive arrangement be-
tween firms. Under the destination principle, an increase in t1 and a decrease in
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t2 both reduce the incentive for the high-tax firm 2 to defect from the collusive
agreement, either by reducing the exporting profits in market 1 or by increasing
the monopoly profits that can be earned in its home market 2. Under the origin
principle, an alignment of taxes reduces the competitive advantage of the low-tax
firm 1; this reduces firm 1’s gains from exporting and also increases its losses in the
punishment phase.
Hence, if diﬀerences in tax rates are exogenous to the model (implying that they
are derived from asymmetries that are unrelated to the profitability of firms), then
the argument against tax rate harmonization becomes a general one in our tacit col-
lusion setting, and applies equally under the destination and origin principles. This
provides an interesting contrast to the argument — made in the previous literature
and confirmed in Proposition 4 above — that the eﬀects of tax rate harmonization
depend crucially on the tax principle in operation. Instead, Proposition 5 parallels
the general case against tax rate harmonization developed in the political economy
literature (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; see also Edwards and Keen, 1996). In this
strand of literature it is usually argued that when governments are not suﬃciently
disciplined by the political process, then tax competition between governments can
play a corrective role that shouldn’t be precluded by tax rate agreements. In a simi-
lar way, firms behave non-competitively in the present setting of tacit collusion. Tax
diﬀerentials can correct this market failure by inducing firms to engage in ‘exporting
wars’, and this incentive should not be weakened by an alignment of commodity tax
rates between countries.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the eﬀects of international commodity tax policies on
the stability of collusive agreements between firms. Such non-competitive behaviour,
aimed at maintaining national monopolies, is still present in various segments of the
European industry and the question we have raised here is whether tax policy can
help to promote the incentives for firms to leave the collusive arrangement and enter
foreign markets. We have asked two distinct questions for tax policy. First, is the
destination or the origin principle to be preferred as a means of inducing competition
between firms? Second, how is the incentive to leave a secret cartel aﬀected by tax
rate harmonization, as currently discussed in the European Union?
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We have pursued these questions in two diﬀerent settings. In the first, production
costs diﬀer between firms and an international commodity tax diﬀerential reflects
non-cooperative responses of national governments to the cost asymmetry (as de-
rived in previous literature on the subject). In the second scenario, an exogenous
diﬀerence in tax rates is the only asymmetry, implying that the determinants of
national commodity tax rates are unrelated to the profitability of firms.
Turning first to the choice of an international commodity tax principle, our
analysis generally favours the origin over the destination principle when a positive
correlation between costs of production and tax rates is incorporated into our tacit
collusion framework. The basic eﬀect at work is that tax diﬀerentials under the origin
principle reinforce the asymmetries in the competitive positions of the two firms and
thus weaken the common interest of the two firms in maintaining a socially harmful
secret cartel. When tax rates are the only asymmetry, there is no unambiguous
answer to the question of whether the destination or the origin principle is more
likely to induce duopoly competition. However, if the model is extended to allow
for more than two countries and firms, then the destabilizing eﬀect of this extension
is stronger under the origin principle. In sum, therefore, our results indicate that
the policy case in favour of the origin principle extends to settings of imperfect
competition that are quite diﬀerent from the ones that have been discussed in the
previous literature.
With respect to the issue of tax rate harmonization, our conclusions in the case
where tax diﬀerentials interact with other asymmetries are strikingly similar to
those obtained in a setting of duopoly competition between firms (Keen, Lahiri and
Raimondos-Møller, 2002). Tax rate harmonization is undesirable under the origin
principle, whereas it is beneficial under the destination principle. The alternative
scenario with isolated tax diﬀerences leads instead to the unambiguous result that
tax harmonization stabilizes socially undesirable secret cartels under both the des-
tination and origin principles. This result reinforces earlier arguments against tax
rate harmonization derived from a political economy perspective and indicates that
tax coordination may encourage cartelization not only among governments, but also
among firms. If non-competitive behaviour by both governments and firms are seen
as relevant features of European economies, then this indeed raises serious doubts
about the medium-term plans of the European Commission to fully harmonize VAT
rates in the European Union.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We denote the numerators in (15) and (16) by nDP and nOP , respectively, while
the denominators are indicated by dDP and dOP . This yields
nDP − nOP = α2
·
α2
(t1 − t2)
(1 + t2)
+ 2c1(t1 − t2)
¸
, (A.1)
from which follows sign (nDP − nOP ) = sign (t1 − t2).
For the denominators the comparison is
dDP − dOP = c2(t2 − t1)[4α2 − 2(1 + t1)(c2 − c1)]. (A.2)
Using condition (7), this implies sign (dDP − dOP ) = − sign (t1 − t2). From (A.1)
and (A.2) together we thus get sign (θ¯DP1 − θ¯OP1 ) = sign (t1 − t2). 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
To prove Proposition 2 we show that the diﬀerence in the critical values under
the destination and origin principles is increasing in the market size parameter a
and decreasing in unit costs c. Hence, we have to prove that
∂θ¯DP2
∂a
− θ¯
OP
1
∂a
> 0,
∂θ¯DP2
∂c
− θ¯
OP
1
∂c
< 0. (A.3)
Diﬀerentiating ∂θ¯DP2 and ∂θ¯
OP
1 with respect to a and using α2 + c(t2 − t1) = α1
from (5) yields
∂θ¯DP2
∂a
=
−2 (1 + t2)α1c (t2 − t1)
(1 + t1)α32
,
∂θ¯OP1
∂a
=
−2c (t2 − t1) (α1 + α2)
[α2 − c (t2 − t1)]3
.
(A.4)
Partial diﬀerentiation with respect to c proceeds analogously. This gives, using
(1 + t2)α1 − (1 + t1)α2 = a(t2 − t1)
∂θ¯DP2
∂c
=
2α1 (1 + t2) a (t2 − t1)
(1 + t1)α32
,
∂θ¯OP1
∂c
=
2 (α1 + α2) a (t2 − t1)
[α2 − c (t2 − t1)]3
.
(A.5)
Combining the two terms in (A.4) yields
∂θ¯DP2
∂a
− ∂θ¯
OP
1
∂a
=
2c (t2 − t1)Γ
(1 + t1)α32 [α2 − c (t2 − t1)]
3 , (A.6)
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and similarly for the terms in (A.5)
∂θ¯DP2
∂c
− ∂θ¯
OP
1
∂c
=
−2a (t2 − t1)Γ
(1 + t1)α32 [α2 − c (t2 − t1)]
3 , (A.7)
where
Γ = α32 (α1 + α2) (1 + t1)− (1 + t2)α1 [α2 − c (t2 − t1)]
3 .
The denominators of (A.6) and (A.7) are positive from (7). Hence, Γmust be positive
for (A.3) to hold. Partly multiplying out the terms in Γ gives
Γ = α42 (1 + t1)− α32α1(t2 − t1) + 3(1 + t2)α2α1c(t2 − t1) [α2 − c (t2 − t1)]
+ (1 + t2)α1c
3(t2 − t1)3.
Using α1 = α2 + c(t2 − t1), this can be rearranged to
Γ = α42 (1 + 2t1 − t2)− α32c(t2 − t1)2 + 2(1 + t2)α2α1c(t2 − t1) [α2 − c (t2 − t1)]
+(1 + t2)α2c(t2 − t1)
£
α22 − c2(t2 − t1)2
¤
+ (1 + t2)α1c
3(t2 − t1)3
= α42 (1 + 2t1 − t2) + 2(1 + t2)α2α1c(t2 − t1) [α2 − c (t2 − t1)]
+(1 + t1)α
3
2c(t2 − t1) + (1 + t2)c4(t2 − t1)4 > 0,
which can be signed from 1 ≥ t2 ≥ t1 ≥ 0 and equation (7). 2
26
Acknowledgements:
Paper presented at the 55th Congress of the International Institute of Public
Finance in Moscow and at research workshops in Bergen, Copenhagen, Kiel and
Konstanz. We thank Yongmin Chen, Bernd Genser, Morten Hviid, Kjell Erik Lom-
merud, Ju¨rgen Meckl, Jack Mintz, Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller,
Christian Schulze, Christian Seidl, Peter Birch Sørensen, Lars Sørgard and Frank
Sta¨hler for many helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to two
anonymous referees for their detailed and constructive criticism. Financial support
from the Research Council of Norway, grant no. 124559/510, is greatly appreciated.
27
References
Abreu, D., 1986. Extremal equilibria of oligopoly supergames. Journal of Economic
Theory 39, 191-225.
Bernheim, D, and M. Whinston, 1990. Multimarket contact and collusive behavior.
Rand Journal of Economics 21, 1-26.
Boadway, R., M. Marchand and P. Pestieau, 1994. Towards a theory of the direct-
indirect tax mix. Journal of Public Economics 55, 71-88.
Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer, 1985. Export subsidies and international market
share rivalry. Journal of International Economics 18, 83-100.
Brennan, G. and J. Buchanan, 1980. The power to tax. Analytical foundations of
a fiscal constitution. Cambridge University Press.
Cnossen, S., 1998. Global trends and issues in value added taxation. International
Tax and Public Finance 5, 399-428.
Delipalla, S., 1997. Commodity tax harmonisation and public goods. Journal of
Public Economics 63, 447-466.
Delipalla, S., Keen, M., 1992. The comparison between ad valorem and specific
taxation under imperfect competition. Journal of Public Economics 49, 351-
367.
Diamond, P.A., Mirrlees, J.A., 1971. Optimal taxation and public production,
Part I: Production eﬃciency. American Economic Review 61, 8-27.
Edwards, J., Keen, M., 1996. Tax competition and Leviathan. European Economic
Review 40, 113-134.
European Commission, 1996. A common system of value added taxation. A pro-
gramme for the Internal Market. Document COM (96) 328, Brussels.
Fudenberg, D., Maskin, E., 1986. The folk theorem in repeated games with dis-
counting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54, 533-554.
Gendron, P.-P., 2001. Corporation tax asymmetries and cartel unity. International
Tax and Public Finance 8, 659-674.
28
Haufler, A., Schjelderup, G., 2000, Tacit collusion under destination- and origin-
based commodity taxation, CESifo working paper No. 283, University of Mu-
nich.
Haufler, A., G. Schjelderup and F. Sta¨hler, 2000. Commodity taxation and interna-
tional trade in imperfect markets, CESifo Working Paper No. 376, University
of Munich.
Kanbur, R., Keen, M., 1993. Jeux sans frontie`res: Tax competition and tax coordi-
nation when countries diﬀer in size. American Economic Review 83, 877-892.
Keen, M., 1987. Welfare eﬀects of commodity tax harmonization. Journal of Public
Economics 33, 107-114.
Keen, M., 1989. Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonization. European Economic
Review 33, 1-12.
Keen, M., Lahiri, S., 1993. Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly. Journal
of Public Economics 51, 55-74.
Keen, M., Lahiri, S., 1998. The comparison between destination and origin prin-
ciples under imperfect competition. Journal of International Economics 45,
323-350.
Keen, M., Lahiri, S., Raimondos-Møller, P., 2002. Tax principles and tax harmo-
nization under imperfect competition: a cautionary example. European Eco-
nomic Review, forthcoming.
Keen, M., Smith, S., 1996. The future of value-added tax in the European Union.
Economic Policy 23, 375-420.
Keen, M., Wildasin, D., 2000. Pareto eﬃciency in international taxation. CESifo
Working Paper No. 371, University of Munich.
King, S.P., 1997. National competition policy. Economic Record 73, 270-284.
Lahiri, S., Raimondos-Møller, P., 1998. Public good provision and the welfare eﬀects
of indirect tax harmonization. Journal of Public Economics 67, 253-267.
Lockwood, B., 1993. Commodity tax competition under destination and origin
principles. Journal of Public Economics 53, 141-162.
29
Lockwood, B., 1997. Can international commodity tax harmonisation be Pareto-
improving when governments supply public goods?. Journal of International
Economics 43, 387-408.
Lockwood, B., 2001. Tax competition and tax co-ordination under destination and
origin principles: a synthesis. Journal of Public Economics 81, 279-319.
Lockwood, B., de Meza, D., Myles, G., 1994. When are origin and destination
regimes equivalent? International Tax and Public Finance 1, 5-24.
Lommerud, K.E., Sørgard, L., 2001. Trade liberalization and cartel stability. Re-
view of International Economics 9, 343-355.
Lopez-Garcia, M.-A., 1996. The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect
tax harmonization. International Tax and Public Finance 3, 83-93.
Lopez-Garcia, M.-A., 1998. On welfare and revenue eﬀects of indirect tax harmo-
nization. Economics Letters 60, 185-193.
Martin, S., 1993. Advanced Industrial Organization. Blackwell, Mass.
Marvel, H., 1982. Exclusive dealing. Journal of Law and Economics 25, 1-26.
Mintz, J., Tulkens, H., 1986. Commodity tax competition between member states
of a federation: Equilibrium and eﬃciency. Journal of Public Economics 29,
133-172.
Purohit, M.C., 2001. Issues in introducing VAT in federal countries. A case study
of India. Paper presented at the 57th Congress of the International Institute
of Public Finance, Linz, Austria, August 27-30, 2001.
Rotemberg, J., Saloner, G., 1989. Tariﬀs vs. quotas with implicit collusion. Cana-
dian Journal of Economics 22, 237-244.
Scherer, F., 1996. International trade and competition policy. Discussion paper No.
96-18, Industrial Economics and International Management Series, Harvard
University.
Slade, M., 1995. Empirical games: the oligopoly case. Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics 96, 368-402.
30
Steen, F., Sørgard, L., 1999. Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market. Eu-
ropean Economic Review 43, 1775-1796.
Tirole, J., 1988. The theory of industrial organisation. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass.
Trandel, G.A., 1994. Interstate commodity tax diﬀerentials and the distribution of
residents. Journal of Public Economics 53, 435-457.
Venables, A.J., 1986. Producton subsidies, import tariﬀs and imperfectly competi-
tive trade. In: Greenaway, D., Tharakan, P.K.M. (Eds.), Imperfect competition
and international trade. Sussex, Wheatsheaf.
31
